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WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

which they reside, when they have married outside the state, with the
further provision that if the resident has left the state for the purpose of
marrying to avoid the prohibition of the statutes of the domicile and with
the intention of returning, and if he subsequently does return, the validity
of the marriage will be determined by the laws of the domicile." Recent
court interpretations of the Uniform Act as well as some of the statutes of
states that are concerned with the evasion problem 12 require the bad faith
element, the intent to evade the provisions of the statutes, in order for
the validity of the marriage to be successfuly questioned.
North Dakota has a statute unlike that of any other state. It provides
that two nonresidents may not marry within the state except when the
parents of either reside there. 13 This would tend to prevent domililiaries
of another state from being married in North Dakota to evade the laws
of their own state. Thus it has the same effect as section two of the Mar14
riage Evasion Act.
. The remaining states have no statutory provisions on the validity of
foreign marriages.' 5
Study of the dates of statutes and court decisions involving the marriage evasion problem does not disclose any current trend either toward
or away from the adoption of a marriage evasion policy. The state of
the law appears to be static rather than dynamic.
CARL H.

SMITH, JR.

THE LICENSE PROBLEM
When the problem is only one of definition, there seems to be no
trouble in discovering the exact nature of a license. Lay or legal, dictionaries agree that a license is a permit to do something which would
otherwise be illegal.'
But the task of determining the nature of a license is not so easy
as
might at first appear, and is presented to courts in a great many different
ways. One of the first problems encountered is the determination of
whether a particular license is a right or only a mere privilege. If it is a
right, then after it has once been obtained, agencies dealing with the
licensee must afford him at least a degree of due process. before they can
deprive him of that right.2 If the license is determined to be nothing more
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Maine, New Hampshire, and Virginia.
Alabama, Arizona, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts (Note 1 supra), Mississippi,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Utah.
N.D. Rev. Stat. § 14-0310 (1943), as amended by House Bill No. 555, c. 120 (1951).
Note 1 supra, § 2, Uniform Marriage Evasion Act.
Florida, Iowa, Missouri, South Carolina, and South Dakota.

1.

Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 1067; Webster's New International Dictionary,
2nd Ed., p. 1425.

2.

On this point see 33 Am.Jur. 341.

NoTEs
than a mere privilege, the licensee will find that it receives little court
protection. 3
On the surface the criteria for categorizing licenses as rights or privileges are fairly well defined. A license to do something or to carry on
some business which is generally useful, advantageous to the public and not
very liable to do much harm is often considered to be a right. 4 Licenses to
6
practice dignified professions such as law 5 and medicine are usually
considered to be in this category, along with many business enterprises
7
such as running a school.
On the other hand, licenses which permit something not generally
useful or which may be harmful to the health or morals of the community
are categorized as mere privileges. 8 The best examples of this are the
licensing of the sale of intoxicating beverages, which has a fairly solid
standing as mere privilege, 9 and pool hall permits. 10 It is confusing, however, to note that automobile licenses," milk sales, 12 and (in the State of
Maine) even lobster fishing licenses' 3 are apt to be called mere privileges.
With this generalization in mind let us turn to Wyoming case law on
licenses, with this question in mind: to what extent must the due process
clause be considered in connection with procedures for the issuance and
14
revocation of permits for various licensed acts?
On the subject of liquor, Wyoming seems to be willing to use the
"right and privilege" test in arriving at a solution, and joins a host of
other courts' 5 in holding that a liquor license is a mere privilege. In a
prosecution for violation of the Sunday liquor laws, the Wyoming court
categorized liquor regulations as expression of the police power and, therefore, not under the due process clause.' 6 Thus categorized, it can be
presumed that a liquor dealer may have his license summarily revoked7
without being able to argue that the revoking agency or the statute'
providing for the license failed to accord him a fair hearing after notice.
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See 33 Am.Jur. 383.
Supra note 2.
Goldsmith v. U.S. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 70 L.Ed. 494, 46 S.Ct. 215
(1926); Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 352, 207 Pac. 724 (1922); and on professions in
general see Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 32 L.Ed. 623, 9 S.Ct. 231 (1888).
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 32 L.Ed. 623, 9 S.Ct. 231 (1888); Smith v.
State Board of Medical Examiners, 140 Iowa 66, 117 N.W. 1116 (1908).
Gilchrist v. Bierring, 234 Iowa 899, 14 N.W.2d 724 (1944).
Supra note 3.
State v. Smart, 22 Wyo. 154, 136 Pac. 452 (1913) ; Floeck v. Bureau of Revenue, 44
N.M. 194, 100 P.2d 225 (1940); and see 137 A.L.R. 803 and 35 A.L.R.2d 1067.
Commonwealth v. Kinsley, 133 Mass. 578 (1882).
Nulter v. State I1oad Commission, 119 W.Va. 312, 193 S.E. 549 (1937); and see 10
A.L.R.2d 833.
People ex rel. Lodes v. Department of Health, 189 N.Y. 187, 82 N.E. 187, 13 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 894 (1907).
State v. Cote, 122 Me. 450, 120 Atl. 538 (1923).
Since all licenses exist only as some governing body requires them, one must always
look to the act setting up the license to find just how much due process is accorded.
See 137 A.L.R. 803 and 35 A.L.R.2d 1067.
State v. Smart, 22 Wyo. 154, 136 Pac. 452 (1913).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 53-225 (1945).
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On the other hand, Wyoming has held that an optometrist cannot be
deprived of his right to practice without good reason, and above all, notice
thereof.' 8 In Franzel v. Examiners in Optometry an optometrist paid his
fee with a bad check and the board mailed notice to the doctor to appear
and show cause why his license should not be revoked, but he never
received it. The Board then summarily revoked his license. The statute
called for notice and a hearing. The court held that a professional license
could not be revoked under such circumstances. The court seemed to see
a necessity for substantive due process (actual notice and hearing), while
the board seemed interested only in a technical application of due process.
Though not so stated, the real reason for the court interpretation might
well be the feeling that more than a mere privilege is involved in the
protecting of the right to practice a legitimate profession, while in the
case of liquor the court feels that a potentially harmful occupation needs
little court or statutory protection.
On the question of automobile drivers' licenses, Wyoming has more or
less adopted a middle of the road policy. An early case on the subject 19
referred to a driver's license as a "privilege granted by law," 20 which put a
burden on the Highway Commission to prove a right under the facts of
any case to revoke it. In this case the driver failed to prove financial
responsibility after an accident, but the Department failed to prove any
financial loss to anyone. By holding for the driver the court clearly indicated
that not only were notice and a hearing necessary, but also that the burden
fell on the Highway Department to make out a good case with definite
proofs.
In the most recent Wyoming case on the subject of drivers' licenses2 '
the right or priv'ilege solution was mentioned and considered but not used,
as the court found the statute itself 22 unconstitutional in that there was an
improper delegation of legislative powers to the Highway Commission.
This case held that the legislature had to set standards for what facts the
Highway Commission had to find in order to revoke a license, and could
not leave it so vague as to be a purely discretionary matter.
Probably these Wyoming cases on drivers' licenses show a trend which
it would be well for all courts to consider. Despite talk about usefulness,
danger to the public, mere privilege and all that goes with these words,
it still seems that it is a faulty solution to any license case to try to categorize
and then give or deny due process according to the category. It would be
hard to believe that selling a can of beer one minute after closing time is
so much more dangerous to the public than a completely incompetent
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Frenzel v. Examiners in Optometry, 52 Wyo. 328, 74 P.2d 343 (1937).
Travegia v. Wyoming Highway Department, 67 Wyo. 93, 214 P.2d 975 (1949).
Travegia v. Wyoming Highway Department, 67 Wyo. 93, 113, 214 P.2d 975 (1949).
Eastwood v. Wyoming Highway Department, ____ Wyo-..
301 P.2d 818 (1956).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 60-1615 (1945) as amended. Subsection 4 provides for revocation
if "the person . . . is incompetent or is unfit to operate a motor vehicle upon any
grounds upon which license might be refused as stated in this Act." This is the
only revocation clause and the Act has no grounds for refusal.

NOTES

doctor, that we can summarily revoke the beer license while we must
leave the doctor to go on filling graveyards until notice and a complete
hearing have taken place. From the pecuniary aspect both licenses probably
represent a very substantial investment.
Where the usual method of solving a problem has been criticised as
unfair, it is in order to offer an alternative solution. In the matter of
licenses this does not seem to be too difficult. Actually nearly all kinds of
licenses require certain standards before granting, and an agency should
not refuse to grant, or revoke, any license so long as there is compliance
with these standards. Thus all that needs to be added is that with any
license the agency should actually have to find the non-compliance after
the licensee has been given notice and a chance to defend, rather than
refusing or revoking certain licenses on mere suspicion or hearsay and
without hearing or notice. Where there is a real danger, and summary
revocation would seem to be necessary, the use of an injunction could
solve the problem, thereby protecting the public in all things and not just
within certain categories. Little burden would be added either to agencies
or to courts. Even now agencies seldom revoke without some sort of fact
finding. Actually, more stringent due process requirements in granting
and revoking licenses would probably cut down the number of cases
coming into the courts.
DONALD L. YOUNG

ANOTHER LOOK AT THE MARTEL CASE
In the Martell case, an oil and gas lessee brought suit against a trespasser. Martel, the lessee, attempted to recover damages for the value of
the mineral interest for leasing purposes from the trespasser who drilled a
dry hole thereby rendering the lease valueless as a speculation. The
Wyoming court denied recovery on the ground that Martel's damages were
too speculative. Barquin, Martel's lessor, in an action arising out of the
same trespass, 2 recovered for surface damages and punitive damages. In
both of these cases, the court said that a right had been violated and the
parties so deprived could recover damages as shown. Plaintiff's counsel
in the Martel case brought to the court's attention the Kishi3 case in which
the Texas court allowed recovery under a similar situation. The Wyoming
court said that it was not disposed to follow the holding of the Kishi case.
Out of this background has grown a general belief that the holdings in
these two cases are in direct conflict 4 as to whether a mineral owner may

recover for the type of trespass involved in the Martel case. This note will
be concerned with a discussion as to whether these cases truly represent
conflicting views as to the rights of the injured party.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 36 Wyo. 166, 253 Pac. 862 (1927).
Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, 33 Wyo. 92, 237 Pac. 255 (1927).
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Kishi (Tex. Comm. App.), 276 S.W. 190 (1925).
1 Wyo. L.J. 123 (1946).

